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Abstract: The sharing economy has generated interest among economists for its customer focus
and potential to enhance competition. However, it has also caused uproar in industries which
have felt  competitive pressure,  for example among the established stakeholders in the taxi
industry. While regulations currently impose considerable costs on the taxi industry, they do not
cover virtual transport innovations such as Uber. The lack of a level playing field between taxis
and such ‘crowd-taxis’ has generated media attention and conflict. Taxi owners worry about
decreasing revenues and taxi drivers about poor working conditions. Other concerns are related
to poor transport preparedness, accessibility issues, quality assurance and tax evasion. Despite
considerable media attention, there has so far been a lack of scholarly literature addressing the
consequences of the sharing economy in the transport sector. Focusing on the Norwegian taxi
market,  we  argue  that  crowd-taxis  will  likely  produce  a  range  of  unanticipated  effects,
necessitating  regulation.  For  example,  crowd-taxis  may  contribute  to  a  loss  of  transport
preparedness  in  rural  areas.  The  findings  are  based  on  first  and  secondary  data  and  19
interviews.
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INTRODUCTION
The sharing economy is rapidly affecting different transport markets. One such sector is the taxi
industry, where strict regulations impose high costs on the operators and favour the operators
that are already in the market. Given the disintermediating effects of new technologies such as
smartphones and social media, new service providers impose considerable competition to the
existing taxi services. These new operators are ‘crowd-taxis’ which make use of web applications
including myTaxi, Taxi Magic and Uber. In interviews, representatives of these firms argue that
they want to be viewed as something different from a taxi service. While offering services that
are  similar  to  taxis,  crowd-taxis  are  actors  ‘outside’  the  regulated  taxi  industry.  Several
researchers emphasise the benefits of such innovations, arguing that they are likely to do a
better job of serving consumer needs than traditional services – therefore bringing into question
the need for much of the existing regulation (Koopman, Mitchell & Thierer, 2014). However,
historically taxi regulations have contributed to ‘tidying’ up the market, pushing operators in the
‘grey’  area  into  the  ‘white’  economy  (Fagerli,  Strømsnes  &  Langli,  2000).  Taxis  provide
important services for the society as a whole, including 24-hour preparedness and transport
services where there may otherwise be no public transport. Taxi policies play an important role
in ensuring for example, customers’ safety. We therefore ask the question: what are the effects of
these new transport innovations on traditional taxi services?
While cities are attractive markets in terms of being profitable for transport providers, rural
areas are usually considered less profitable because of longer travel distances. The effects on taxi
services and related impacts for society and welfare may therefore vary across areas. A study of
the transport sector in Norway is relevant because it is a large country in terms of area (385,000
square kilometres) with a relatively small population (5.2 million people), living in cities and
many small, rural municipalities.
Including  issues  of  quality,  safety  and  preparedness,  this  study  contributes  to  improved
understanding of the border between ‘sharing’ as a private activity and public concern. To study
this transport sector is interesting as the topic has been widely cited as an example of the effect
of the sharing economy by the media, but – with few exceptions (Cohen & Sundararajan, 2015)
– remains under-analysed.
The roadmap is as follows. First, we provide useful insights from the literature to understand the
effects on the transport market and society. Second, we present the data that we use. Third, we
describe the different transport services, both traditional taxi services and innovations. Fourth,
we  present  the  views  and  concerns  of  providers.  Fifth,  we  discuss  the  implications  of
innovations  for  the  taxi  market  and  society.  Finally,  we  conclude  that  virtual  crowd-taxis
contribute to strengthening a tendency of weakening revenue base among taxi  owners and
creating an unlevel playing field. Deregulating the taxi market so that virtual crowd-taxis have
access will contribute to a loss of transport preparedness in rural areas with consequences for
accessibility. Currently, traditional taxis cover such transport needs. The decreasing revenue
base and the structure of the sharing economy incentive scheme leads to gaps in coverage, as
drivers will tend to go to more high-paying zones only. Therefore, there might be a need for local
public authorities to provide for such transport preparedness.
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THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
The aim of this section is twofold: first, we present Rob Shield’s perspective of virtual technology
to create a frame for understanding the taxi sector as such in the context of virtual technologies.
This is useful as taxis are typically treated as part of the transport sector and rarely within the
field of virtual technology. Second, in order to explore the impacts of crowd-taxis on the taxi
market and related societal effects, we draw on contributions related to the post-fordist service
economy and professionalisation theory.
The concept of the virtual is relevant as information technology contributes to dramatic changes
in economics and everyday life. In his work on the virtual, Rob Shields (2003) identifies some of
the different beliefs and fears that have surrounded computer technology. He defines virtual as
‘real but not concrete’  (p.  2,  italics in original).  He argues that: ‘To describe something as
“virtual” indicates that it is not strictly according to definition, as in a “virtual office”, which is to
say not literally an “office” as one might understand an office to be, but an office “in effect”’ (p.
23). In other words, ontologically the virtual office is real in purpose and effects, although not
‘concrete’. Shields argues that a physical office (or organisation) is related to a place. However,
the network on the internet precedes even virtual  space,  allowing for flexible work among
employees  and  an  agile  and  responsive  organisation  (p.  118).  Shields  suggests  that  first,
information technology replaces old technologies but in existing ways of working. For example,
taxi companies make use of similar technologies as crowd-taxis, yet taxis continue to operate
more or less in the same way as before. Shields argues that the more important implications
occur  when  expertise  and  enterprises  across  time  and  space  intermingle  (p.  119),  giving
businesses the opportunity to combine jobs and cluster work tasks (p. 147). Shields provides a
thorough historical analysis of the virtual. However, he does not make ‘the virtual’ a key aspect
of the modern networked society (see Kellner and Thomas, n.d.).
In contrast, researchers and interest groups focusing on crowdsourcing and crowdworking in
the post-fordist service economy suggest that virtual technologies have resulted in a shift of
paradigm (see Felstiner, 2011, p. 145). Describing how in the age of the internet companies arose
to  take  advantage  of  the  networked  world  in  search  of  cheaper  labour,  Wired  Magazine
journalist Jeff Hove, introduced the label ‘crowdsourcing’. He wrote, ‘Technological advances
[…] are breaking down the cost barriers that once separated amateurs from professionals. […]
The labor isn’t always free, but it costs a lot less than paying traditional employees. It’s not
outsourcing; it’s crowdsourcing’ (Hove, 2006). Hove pointed out that established businesses
were taking advantage of the online connected crowd. Although crowdsourcing has increased
remarkably  during  the  last  decade,  it  is  still  relatively  new.  Hove’s  focus  was  on  paid
crowdsourcing. There is also voluntary, unpaid crowdsourcing, which refers to people sharing
for example, their capacity or knowledge for free, and contribute to common goods or non-
commercial work.
Alek Felstiner (2011) defines crowdsourcing as ‘the process of taking tasks that would normally
be delegated to an employee and distributing them to a  large pool  of  online workers,  the
"crowd,"  in the form of  an open call’  (p.  143).  He compares crowdsourcing with domestic
subcontracting,  temporary  staffing  and  outsourcing  of  products.  The  crowdsourcing
‘middlemen’, for example the owners of the Uber application, exercise some kind of control over
the workers and obtain revenue (p. 149).
Authors  (e.g.,  Felstiner,  2011;  Cohen & Sundararajan,  2015)  point  out  the positive  aspects
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related to crowdsourcing for workers. One key advantage is the flexibility for the worker to work
when, where and how long s/he wants to and the freedom to choose tasks. They also highlight
the low barriers to enter and exit different markets, as an internet connection is ‘all’ a crowd
worker needs,  which bears the potential  to create new labour markets.  Such opportunities
spread  optimism  about  work  possibilities  in  areas  without  sufficient  labour  markets  for
example, in rural areas.
However,  researchers  highlight  several  issues  related  to  crowd work.  First,  the  wages  are
frequently low, there are no benefits and job security is lacking. The employment relationships
are usually fleeting and the workers do not enjoy legal protection. Second, there are concerns
about  market  failures  due  to  information  asymmetry  and  negative  externalities  (Cohen  &
Sundararajan, 2015). Related to asymmetric information, a buyer may not know the quality of
the work. Such uncertainty may result in less transactions than what is socially optimal (Cohen
&  Sundararajan,  2015,  p.  120).  However,  as  Cohen  and  Sundararajan  (2015)  suggest,
increasingly  software  solutions  dependent  on  exchange  of  experiences  among  users  are
grappling with reputation of workers as a way of quality assurance. Moreover, the choices made
by a buyer or provider may create negative externalities,  i.e.  imposing costs on others.  An
additional taxi vehicle on the road may contribute to congestion and increasing emissions due to
more empty driving, i.e. driving without passengers (Cohen and Sundararajan, 2015, p. 122).
Another perspective, which may be relevant to understanding the effect of virtual technology on
the transport sector is professionalisation theory, since crowd-taxis can be offered by anyone. A
profession is  a  job that  requires special  education,  training or skills.  Modes of  training or
preparation for a profession contribute to keep knowledge within the occupational group, while
standards  help  maintain  the  reputation  of  competent  practitioners  (Eraut,  1994,  p.  6).
Moreover, the workers’  power and status are dependent on their ability to claim that their
expertise is unique, i.e, it is not shared with other groups (Eraut, 1994, p.14). However, Eraut
(1994) argues that traditional accounts of professionalism is becoming outmoded. Addressing
services, he suggests that there has been a change in focus from profession to the client. He
suggests that while there has been a growing distrust of scientific and technical knowledge,
client needs and rights have increasingly gained acceptance. Politicians have therefore sought to
regulate professional work to a larger extent. Similarly, the service-dominant logic of marketing
suggests that the web-wired world reconnects supply and demand of services in new ways which
increases the focus on the consumer further (Ballantyne & Varey, 2008). Concern for citizens’
rights and the increasing cost of public services has given rise to the potentially conflicting aims
of efficiency, effectiveness, economy, responsiveness and quality. Extending this argument, we
could expect virtual technologies to contribute to break down in certain professions, if such
technologies make it easier for people, who are not part of a profession, to deliver such services.
DATA AND RESEARCH TECHNIQUES
The analysis  draws on primary  and secondary  data,  with  the  former  gathered through 19
interviews in two rounds. First, seven interviews took place in late 2014 and early 2015 as part of
a study of the taxi services in Buskerud county. Second, during the second half of 2015 and early
2016 we carried out  12  supplementary  interviews for  the  purpose  of  studying the  sharing
economy (see Appendix). The interviewees include the management (CEO or regional director)
of five taxi companies, which operate as dispatchers and providers of taxi services in Oslo and
Drammen (Oslo Taxi, ByTaxi, Star Taxi, Drammen Taxi and Norgestaxi Buskerud). They include
representatives for the regional licensing authorities in Oslo and Akershus counties and the
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management  of  both  small  and  large  dominating  dispatchers.1  Other  interviewees  are  the
market director of the ride-sharing service GoMore and the chairman of the board and chief
advisor of the Association of Norwegian Taxi Owners, which represents more than half of the
registered taxi  owners  in  Norway,  and the general  manager  and market  manager  of  Uber
Norway.  We  have  gathered  information  from  taxi  drivers  (one  owner  operator  and  three
employed  drivers)  and  four  crowd-taxi  drivers  (i.e.  Uber  drivers).  Representing  different
organisations or interests, the respondents provide different opinions and perceptions rather
than a representative view.
All the interviews took place in and had a key focus on Drammen (in Buskerud), which is located
40 km southwest of Oslo and has 115,000 inhabitants, Oslo with 960,000 inhabitants and the
county Akershus surrounding Oslo with 600,000 inhabitants. In addition to being the largest
taxi  market  in  Norway,  Oslo stands out,  as  it  is  the only  city  in  Norway where Uber has
established itself. In contrast, the counties Akershus and Buskerud are relevant because they
have urban and large rural areas. This is of particular interest as the taxi market is different in
urban and rural areas, with public service obligations being much more important in rural areas
(see Aarhaug, 2015).
The secondary data (Aarhaug, 2015; Aarhaug & Osland, 2010; Aarhaug & Skollerud, 2014;
Longva, Osland & Leiren, 2010) is important because it provides nationwide insights. While this
data  has  been  published  in  Norwegian  research  reports,  much  of  this  information  is  not
accessible in English.
THE NORWEGIAN TAXI MARKET
The rapid  growth of  information technology in  society  has  created new opportunities  and
challenges in the passenger transport market. Through a mobile application, passengers may
request services not only from taxis and ordinary public transport, but from drivers who offer
taxicab-like urban transportation in hundreds of cities all over the world. Applications such as
Uber, Lyft, myTaxi, Taxi Magic and Sidecar offer considerable competition to traditional taxi
companies. Among the companies using mobile phone technology to offer passenger transport,
Uber  is  the  most  visible.  Currently  only  UberPop  and  UberBlack  exist  in  Norway.  While
UberBlack  is  for  linking  customers  with  professional  limousine  drivers,  UberPop  links
passengers to drivers without professional taxi licenses or chauffeur training. In this section we
describe the differences between conventional taxis and what we call ‘crowd-taxis’, i.e. transport
made possible via such applications and functioning outside existing taxi regulations. We use
the  term crowd-taxis  and  not  virtual  taxis  as  conventional  taxis  also  make  use  of  virtual
technologies.  We  focus  on  UberPop,  as  there  are  no  particular  controversies  related  to
UberBlack. However, it is of interest that UberBlack has resulted in stricter entry regulation for
limousine services in Oslo. The regulating authorities prefer to limit the use of limousines as
taxis (Interview 19). In the following, we explore the possibilities and challenges that arise with
virtual transport innovations such as UberPop.
Jørgen Aarhaug and Kåre Skollerud (2014) define a taxi as ‘a vehicle with a driver available for
hire for the general public’ (p. 277). They argue that this definition is useful as it captures a
variety of taxi characteristics in different cities. However, with the arrival of the mentioned
innovations, such a broad concept runs into several issues related to when a taxi ceases to be a
taxi, what the boundary markers of legitimacy between taxis and crowd-taxis are, as well as
whether the boundaries are malleable. The new transport services made possible via mobile
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applications  fall  into  Aarhaug  and  Skollerud’s  definition.  However,  several  innovation
characteristics help us distinguish the new services from conventional taxis. The definition is
therefore not relevant in discussions of the sharing economy – at least as long as the current
legislation remains. In the following, we highlight five characteristics that distinguish taxis from
crowd-taxis.
One distinction is related to taxi permits. In Norway every taxi owner needs to have a taxi
licence, which is a needs-tested permit to offer taxi services in a given area. There is one such
permit  per  car  and  taxi  owner,  who  might  employ  a  couple  of  drivers.  The  regional
administrations are the responsible public authorities for providing such permits. Therefore it
varies across regions how competitive the taxi market is. The key policy behind the Norwegian
needs-testing policy is related to protection of the existing taxi providers: it is to ensure that taxi
services are offered in areas and at times, where and when such services would otherwise not
exist due to lack of profitability (see Longva, Osland & Leiren, 2010). The public authorities
limit the access to the taxi market in order to keep random car owners from ‘cream skimming’ in
good transport markets, thereby eliminating business possibilities in less favourable times and
areas. Furthermore, the needs-testing of taxi permits gives the public authorities an opportunity
to require driving and coverage obligations to ensure access to taxi services at all times (24
hours) at reasonable prices and other quality requirements (Longva, Osland & Leiren, 2010). In
contrast, there are no similar regulations addressing virtual devices. Although Uber facilitates
for  transport,  connecting  drivers  and  passengers  with  each  other,  Uber  does  not  provide
transport services itself. This raises the question of the level and the objective regulation should
address:  whether  the  cloud  efficiencies  and  pricing  algorithms  introduced  by  Uber  may
overcome the challenges created by the difference between profitability for the taxi driver and
society's demand for distribution of service in time and space (see Aarhaug and Skollerud,
2016).
Another distinction is related to the status of the professional versus the non-professional. In
order to offer passenger transport services - which are not regular, the Norwegian professional
transport law requires that the driver has a taxi permit. In addition to a driving license, a taxi
driver has to have good conduct (i.e.  a certificate from the police stating that the driver is
allowed to  drive  commercially),  adequate  professional  competence  (i.e.  local  knowledge  as
tested via local taxi exams) and satisfactory financial capability. These requirements give the
public authorities the possibility to control the services: the police controls the permission to
conduct vocational transport; the tax authorities control the financial viability and the regional
public authorities regulate the permits. In contrast, an Uber driver could be anyone.
On several occasions, the police has arrested and fined non-taxi drivers in Stavanger and Oslo,
including  both  Haxi  and  Uber  drivers  (Moe,  2015;  Riaz,  2015).  Given  the  taxi  permit
requirement in the professional transport law, police lawyers interpret the services offered by
Uber  drivers  as  illegal  ‘private  taxis’.  Awaiting  legal  actions,  commercial  taxis  therefore
experience some protection from the competition of non-regulated market entrants.
A third distinction is related to employment. While a taxi driver is either the taxi owner her-
/himself or the employer of perhaps a couple of drivers, Uber drivers do not have an employer.
Uber drivers are independent contractors who pay a percentage of their fares to Uber. Similarly,
the traditional taxi dispatcher does not employ drivers. However, the taxi dispatchers require
that the taxi owners, who either own or have contracts with a dispatcher, employ a sufficient
number of drivers to be able to provide the services that they are responsible for (e.g. driving
and  coverage  obligations),  thereby  ensuring  transport  preparedness.  This  preparedness  is
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incorporated into the taxi dispatchers’ regulations. This requirement to be on duty at all times
has contributed to ensure the taxi owner’s income for living (Longva, Osland & Leiren, 2010, p.
20). However, ‘to always be ready to drive, and never be able to party’ may also contribute to
making the profession less popular in particular in rural areas, where there may be only one taxi
owner and not many connected to a large dispatcher. In contrast, the Uber drivers are free to
work as much or as little as they want. They are not obliged to drive, although there may be a
transport need; for example, a woman in labour who needs urgent transport to the hospital.
Moreover, the drivers themselves are not guaranteed a livelihood from being Uber drivers and
their  insurance  benefits  are  lower  than  for  taxi  drivers.  Yet  the  Norwegian  Competition
Authority (2015) suggests that the opportunity to be a driver as a second job may make it more
attractive to deliver transport services also in rural areas.
A fourth distinction is that it is compulsory for taxis to use taximeters related to payments.
These are subject to quality controls. In the city of Oslo, the dispatchers can set their own fares,
but the fare schedule is set (a flag fall, and a price per kilometre and minute). In contrast, an
Uber  vehicle  does  not  have  a  taximeter.  The billing  is  done via  smartphone and the  fare
structure is dynamic.
A fifth distinction refers to different market segments. Figure 1 highlights a number of transport
segments (see also Longva, Osland & Leiren, 2010). The existence or importance of the market
segments vary with geographical characteristics. Dense cities have relatively high activity on the
street hire and curb/rank market segments, while the pre-book segment dominates in less dense
cities. Equally, the size of different contract segments varies with geography: the share is larger
in  rural  areas  (Aarhaug,  2015).  The  share  is  considerable  also  in  cities;  for  example,  in
Drammen 40 percent of the turnover comes from contracts with public authorities (Aarhaug &
Osland,  2010).  Such  contracts  include  special  transport  services  for  educational  purposes,
people  with disabilities,  people  of  old age and patients.  The contracts  include accessibility
requirements; for example, part of the vehicle fleet has access for wheelchairs.
Figure 1. Taxi market segments
While conventional taxi services cover all the segments, the new transport services that have
arisen with the virtual technologies are particularly interested in the pre-booked, single trip
segment.  In this  ‘non-contract’  market,  information technologies are decisive for  arranging
transport. Automation and streamlining of connecting drivers and passengers with each other
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contribute  to  user  and  operator  benefits.  Such  possibilities  reduce  the  marginal  cost  by
eliminating manual handling, making it possible for the provider to offer the same services as
conventional taxis at a lower price or with higher profits. In comparison to the other segments,
the pre-booked, single trip market is more price sensitive (Rose & Hensher, 2013). The lower
prices make the crowd-taxis attractive for relevant passengers.
In general, Norwegian consumers perceive taxi fares as being too expensive (The Consumer
Council, 2015a). In rural and small urban areas the 24-hour service obligation is the most cost-
increasing factor. In rural areas fares are regulated by law with given maximum prices. Large
urban areas do not have such price regulation. In many rural areas one consequence of the price
regulation is customer queues, as there are not enough taxis at demand peaks. Another is cross-
subsidisation from services delivered to the public authorities for special transport services, i.e.
contract based services.
A  sixth  distinction  concerns  the  ‘middle  man’,  which  is  a  dispatcher  or  a  mobile  phone
application. While hailing a taxi from the street or a taxi stand only requires a driver and a
vehicle  on  the  supply  side,  pre-booked  trips  usually  require  a  dispatcher.  A  dispatcher
coordinates trips and connects supply (i.e., driver and vehicle) with transport demand (i.e. the
passenger). Historically dispatcher services have been conducted by a person with a phone,
radio and post-it notes. Since the early 1990s dispatchers have made use of computers, with
software that optimises the services.
Internationally  there  is  a  lot  of  variation  in  how dispatchers  are  regulated.  In  Oslo,  it  is
compulsory for every taxi license holder to be associated with one of the dispatchers. Currently
this number is five, but this fluctuates, as anyone can open a new dispatcher, given that they
adhere to a set of criteria. Prior to 2015, when the taxi regulation in Oslo was introduced,
political approval was necessary in order to establish a new dispatcher. Currently, no dispatcher
is allowed to have more than 50 percent of the taxi licenses, in order to limit market domination.
In contrast, crowd-taxis are not connected to traditional taxi dispatchers, but web applications
such as Uber operate as middlemen.
The mentioned six points suggest that Uber drivers have certain competitive advantages in
comparison  to  conventional  taxi  owners  in  the  pre-booking  and  hailing  markets.  The
administrative and fixed costs required for entering new geographical markets are small for
Uber drivers as compared to traditional taxi dispatchers, where the taxi owner is obliged to enter
several different market segments. On the one hand, the differences in regulation and obligation
have created concerns among taxi owners, taxi drivers and the regulating authorities about the
lack of a level playing field between taxis and non-taxi service providers (Interview 1; 7; 11; 19).
The demand from the taxi industry is to create a level playing field - ‘then we’ll beat them’
(Interview 1; Tobiassen, 2016).
On the other hand, there are voices speaking in favour of the web-based transport services.
Private cars represent underused capital. Uber drivers include drivers whose Uber activities is
their principal source of income: ‘Uber is my main source of income, while I am applying for
other jobs and as I have finished my studies this spring’ (Interview 15). Several drivers only offer
such transport services as a part time activity, offering their services in high-demand periods,
‘We have many drivers, but few hours per person’ (Interview 2). They are ordinary car owners,
who have signed up on the web to transport passengers. This use of part time vehicles in high
demand periods contributes to increasing efficiency, as the demand for taxi services fluctuates
considerably  throughout  the  week.  ‘Our  demand  curve  fluctuates  even  more  than  that  of
traditional taxis’ (Interview 2). Moreover, Uber drivers can make use of adoptive pricing. They
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can stimulate the supply by charging higher fees in peak periods and using lower prices in off-
peak periods. This has been controversial as the high peak fare or ‘surge pricing’ is considered as
being unfair, although it improves efficiency (see Tucker, 2014).
None of the informants express negative attitudes towards Uber’s technology.  Uber drivers
suggest that they ‘enjoy the app’ (Interview 13; 14; 15). Similarly, taxi dispatchers, owners and
drivers highlight the benefit of smartphone based technologies (Interview 5; 6; 8). They do not
fear the technology itself - it is the unfair treatment between taxis and crowd-taxis in being
‘allowed’ to use such technology that creates concerns.
One  feature  of  the  sharing  economy  is  that  it  often  adopts  altruism  as  a  motivation  to
participate. The idea is that the owner of the available capacity offers this capacity for a small
amount  of  time.  As  the  capacity  is  available,  sharing  it  makes  everyone  better  off  (even
independent of any transactions which occur between parties). The understanding is that Uber
drivers are in a sense carrying out favours when sharing their vehicle and time. Similarly, there
are examples of young people using social media to tell their friends, ‘I’m driving tonight, if
anyone needs a ride.’ However, UberPop does more than only ‘sharing’ their rides. Taxi interests
highlight the economic aspects:  ‘this is  not sharing,  this is  operating outside the regulated
economy. It is not altruism to drive and not pay taxes’ (Interview 17). It is disputed whether the
exchange of money for labour, provided by independent contractors can be labelled ‘sharing’
(Kessler, 2015).
Furthermore, one of Uber’s aims in Norway is to make it unnecessary for people living in the
city centre to own their own car (Eggesvik, 2015). This way Uber is part of a mobility concept,
where what is important is to get to a destination as quickly and smoothly and possible – not to
get there in your own car. In this way Uber similarly links itself with normative social objectives
such as ‘clean’ or ‘smart’ cities.
However, a key concern among service providers, and regulating authorities, is that crowd-taxis
only provide services when profitable to the driver. Over time, they suggest that this will result
in loss of service in time periods and areas, which are not lucrative for example, rural areas
(Interview 1; 17; 18). While today’s taxi regulation requires coverage in areas and at times where
these services are not profitable for the taxi owner, competition from crowd-taxis may result in a
loss of services. As transport is important for covering a range of everyday needs, this has other
consequences for society. The competition that crowd-taxis provide will make the traditional
taxis lose their income in lucrative areas or times, as the non-taxi prices are lower than what the
taxis can offer.  The regulating authorities are therefore concerned that the result  will  be a
deficiency  of  taxi  services  in  certain  areas  (Interview  18).  In  Sweden  several  smaller
communities no longer have a taxi  service,  because of  the deregulation of  the taxi  market
(Interview 17).
Similarly, in rural areas in Norway, in Salten and Troms, there is a lack of taxi services. In
interviews  carried  out  by  Frode  Longva,  Oddgeir  Osland  and  Merethe  D.  Leiren  (2010),
representatives of public authorities and the taxi industry argued that the disappearance of taxi
services is related to the loss of contracts for driving patients (p. 22). In order to increase
competition  in  competitive  tenders,  public  authorities  have  allowed  tour  bus  operators  to
compete for access to markets that  have traditionally been in the hands of  taxi  operators.
However, the tour bus operators do not have the same driving and coverage obligations as taxis.
Tour bus companies have therefore been able to offer lower prices in competitive rounds. As a
consequence, given the importance of public contracts for the revenue base of taxi owners in
rural areas, taxis have ceased to exist (Interview 1). Interests representing the taxi industry,
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argue that such ‘unfair’ competition has negative consequences for the communities (Interviews
1;  5;  8).  They  are  of  the  opinion  that  Uber,  if  allowed  to  operate  without  the  same
responsibilities  than taxis,  will  contribute  to  strengthening such tendencies  (Interview 17).
There are also concerns related to the status of the profession. A weakening of the revenue base
has resulted in a lower status and increasing recruitment issues (Longva, Osland & Leiren, 2010,
p. 22). Over the last year, the income in the taxi industry as a whole has decreased (Statistics
Norway, 2015).
Others raise concerns with the crowd-taxis’ lack of passenger rights. While taxi dispatchers and
taxi owners have a responsibility to have wheelchair accessible vehicles, baby cribs and so on,
crowd-taxis do not adhere to such regulations. Avoiding such responsibilities makes it possible
for crowd-taxis to charge much lower prices than taxis (Interview 1).
However, Uber services have tried to emphasise optimism about a greener, more efficient future
in  order  to  receive  political  support.  For  example,  the  previous  liberal  City  Council
Commissioner in Oslo has argued, ‘We need cheaper and better taxi services’ (Melby in Osloby,
2015). She is of the opinion that crowd-taxis should be allowed to carry out their services, but
only when pre-booked via the application. In her opinion, crowd-taxis should not be allowed to
attend competitive tenders. Similarly, the Norwegian Competition Authority (2015) is optimistic
about the consumer benefits and has suggested to deregulate the taxi market, removing the taxi
permit and price regulation and allow for services such as Uber. However, it is disputed whether
Uber  represents  ‘greener’  services  than  regulated  taxis,  as  the  authorities  cannot  enforce
environmental standards on unregulated services (Interview 19).
Related to the sharing economy, there are issues of an increasing black or informal economy.
Uber is no exception as the drivers do not have the taximeters, which give information about
income to the authorities. However, the virtual technologies create possibilities. All passengers
pay by credit card, so there is no cash in circulation, and Uber transfers payments weekly
(Eggesvik,  2015).  There  are  ways  to  avoid  tax  evasion  for  example,  if  Uber  reported  all
transactions directly to the authorities. In Estonia there is a function in the Uber application,
which lets the driver easily share such information with the authorities.  Representatives of
virtual transport innovations suggest abolishing current exemptions from taxes to make it easier
to collect taxes. The CEO of ‘Neighbour car’, Even Tangen Heggernes argues, ‘I think tax per
transaction would be best for everyone. […] The sharing economy makes it easy to earn money.
It should be equally easy to pay taxes’ (in Tobiassen, 2015).
DISCUSSION
The evidence suggests that sharing economy innovations affect the taxi market and society in
different ways. For the purpose of understanding the new phenomenon of crowd-taxis in a
virtual context, we start with Shield’s (2003) concept of the virtual: to some extent and in
certain market segments, crowd-taxis, like virtual offices, are ‘taxis’ in purpose and effect. The
sharing economy and the mingling of demand and supply on the internet provide private drivers
with  available  vehicle  capacity  and  passengers  the  opportunity  to  meet.  This  has  created
competitive pressures, which the taxi industry fears. Problems arise because crowd-taxis are not
regulated like traditional taxis - not because of the technology they use.
In the post-fordism service economy, researchers focusing on crowdworking expect low entry
barriers to create the potential for economic development in for example rural areas. However,
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certain conditions might hamper this in the taxi market. While there is a low risk in entering the
market, given that there is little capital investment or employee training, the taxi market in rural
areas is diminishing. One explanation is the importance of contracts with public authorities for
the revenue base. Income from public contracts covers 10-20% in the biggest cities, with some
companies opting out of contract work, and 80-90% in rural areas, where contract services
dominate the market (Aarhaug, 2015). In competitive tenders taxi operators have lost contracts
to  tour-bus  operators,  which  do  not  have  the  same extent  of  service  obligations  as  taxis.
Therefore  the  taxi  industry  already  experiences  competitive  pressures  due  to  other
developments than the virtual innovations. Crowd-taxis increase such pressures further.
The application-based companies have the possibility to undercut prices on pre-booked trips,
thereby undermining the scope for taxi services further. Researchers have found that, in general,
price competition is limited in the taxi markets (Kolesnyk & Mengshoel, 2011) and that fare
elasticities are low (Rose & Hensher, 2013). In other words, the price effects may be minor.
However,  Uber drivers  do not  have the same expenses related to for  example,  taximeters,
uniformed vehicles, dome lights, accessible vehicles, 24h service and full-time employment. It is
therefore likely that crowd-taxis are able to provide a cheaper service, and to drive down the
revenue for taxis. With lower prices, the demand for such transport services could increase.
Moreover, the difference between the flexibility of crowd-taxi drivers and taxi owners, who are
obliged to adhere to driving and coverage obligations duties, is of importance. While the Uber
driver can select which travel demand to serve, the taxi driver has to accept the trips and
responsibilities as given via a taxi dispatcher. In rural areas it is unlikely that a crowd-taxi driver
would be able to be fully employed. The competitive pressures from tour buses has already
contributed to put pressure on the existence of taxi services in rural areas. In such situations
there might be a potential in increasing the supply of transport services by letting more people
drive as their second job. This way crowd-taxis could contribute to keeping the service levels up
in rural areas.
It is a question whether the cloud efficiencies introduced by Uber could solve the issue of cream-
skimming, e.g. the algorithm plus profit maximisation will distribute taxis across 'cream' and
other less profitable areas optimally. If not, in order to ensure a 24h transport preparedness, the
public authorities would have to come up with alternative solutions than being based on a
service, which only occurs when the supplier is interested in meeting the transport demand.
This is in particular an issue in rural areas. In the more lucrative markets in large cities, there
might be enough drivers willing to offer services at different hours of the day, so that in practice
a 24h service would exist.
Related to asymmetric information, it is a question how to ensure that travelling with an Uber
driver is safe and sound. A passenger does not know the qualifications or the intentions of the
driver or the quality of the vehicle. In turn, the driver does not know whether the passenger is
reliable. Such uncertainty is stronger for crowd-taxis than taxis, as taxi drivers have undergone
courses and have good conduct. However, according to a survey carried out by the Norwegian
Consumer Council (2015b), more than half of Norwegian taxi customers have had negative
experiences with the taxi driver and one in four women responded that they have been afraid. In
the bigger cities there have also been several lawsuits related to tax evasion among taxi drivers.
Digital technologies such as online feedback systems allow passengers to learn about the quality
of drivers from prior passengers. The question is whether this is good enough for ensuring the
customers’  quality.  Uber does for example not offer services for people with disabilities or
persons without smartphones. In Norway today 20 percent of the population does not have a
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smartphone (Competition Authority, 2015, p. 2) and is therefore excluded from the web based
transport innovations.
According  to  professionalisation theory,  technology  may contribute  to  changing  the  power
relations in the transport sector. Navigation devices have made it less difficult for everyone to
know where to drive and find the shortest route. It is therefore more difficult for taxi drivers to
claim their unique expertise. The profession has consequently lost power. The weakening of the
revenue base  in  rural  areas  has  contributed to  this  tendency.  The  virtual  technology  may
contribute to strengthen this propensity.
The new virtual technologies challenge the existing legal framework (for an overview, see Witt,
Suzor & Wickström, 2015). One major issue is that crowd-taxis do not contribute with covering
the costs and commitments associated with regulations. Researchers focusing on crowdworking
emphasise deregulation and self-regulation as a possible way of approaching such challenges.
Yet re-regulation tends to go hand in hand with deregulation,  aiming to correct unwanted
market failures or self-regulatory outcomes.
CONCLUSION
The sharing economy has created both optimism and concerns in the transport sector. On the
upside, the easy way of connecting supply and demand through virtual technologies contribute
to  efficiency  gains  in  terms of  utilising  available  capacity.  It  enhances  competition and is
customer-oriented. On the downside, there are concerns about poor transport preparedness,
accessibility issues, worsened working conditions, lack of quality assurance and tax evasion. In
particular the lack of a level playing field between the regulated taxi industry and the web-based
crowd-taxis has created resentment all over the world. In Canada taxi drivers have taken to the
streets,  protesting  against  Uber  (Austen,  2015).  In  New  York  people  with  disabilities  are
concerned with their accessibility (Dwyer, 2015). In France even Uber drivers protest against
Uber (Toor, 2015).
Virtual  technologies  have  contributed  to  intensify  the  tension  between  a  ‘universalist’
perspective and a ‘competitive’ approach: the regulations of the taxi market provides existing
taxi owners and dispatchers some protection, while requiring that they guarantee transport
preparedness  and  that  some  vehicles  are  accessible  to  people  with  special  needs.  Social
solidarity  therefore  justifies  such  protection.  However,  competition  from drivers  operating
outside this regulation using web applications for dispatching undermines this social solidarity
approach. In a competitive situation, a competitor can choose to enter only those markets that
are profitable, thereby depriving the established taxi owners of the revenue to fund universal
services. There are therefore concerns that this endangers the quality of transport services as
well  as  the  transport  preparedness  in  rural  areas.  If  society  wants  these  services  to  be
performed, in a competitive regime, the payment will have to be made to the service providers in
a different way than today's indirect approach.
At present in Norway crowd-taxi drivers avoid costs imposed on conventional taxis through
regulations. While crowd-taxis may contribute with services for example, in peak hours quality
levels may also worsen: there is no guarantee that an Uber driver will choose to drive at the
moment when transport is needed and an Uber driver may not be able to offer for example, a
wheelchair  accessible  vehicle  or  baby crib.  The probability  that  crowd-taxis  will  offer  such
services is currently low.
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The example of the taxi sector shows that competitive pressures and regulatory challenges also
existed prior to crowd-taxis. Politicians are facing a key challenge in how to design new policies
and decide whether to deregulate the taxi industry or regulate crowd-taxis. In the future, new
technologies such as autonomous vehicles may further challenge the possibilities of market
shares and create the need for new regulations. In the meantime, there is uncertainty about how
to practice existing regulations and cases are being decided on in the courts of law. One key
challenge in the 21st  century is  to create regulations which facilitate provision of  safe and
available transport services to the public, both in rural and urban areas. Another is to allow for
the benefits of new technologies without creating an uneven playing field. Given the need for
universal services in rural areas, balancing these competing aims is particularly challenging.
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APPENDIX
List of Interviews
1 Taxi owner interests organisation, management, Oslo, 1.5h, November 2014
2 Non-taxi, management, Oslo, 2h, December 2015
3 Taxi driver, Hønefoss/Drammen, 30 min, November 2014
4 Taxi driver, Hønefoss/Drammen, 30 min, November 2014
5 Taxi driver, Hønefoss/Drammen, 30 min, November 2014
6 Taxi driver, Hønefoss/Drammen, 30 min, November 2014
7 Taxi dispatcher, management, telephone, 1h, November 2014
8 Taxi dispatcher, management, Oslo, 1h, March 2015
9 Taxi dispatcher, management, Oslo, 1.5h, December 2014
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10 Taxi dispatcher, management, telephone (30 min), January 2015
11 Taxi owner, Hønefoss/Drammen (30 min), June 2015
12 Crowd-taxi, communications director, Oslo, 1h, February 2015
13 Crowd-taxi driver, Oslo, 15 min in car with informant, June 2015
14 Crowd-taxi driver, Oslo, 15 min in car with informant, June 2015
15 Crowd-taxi driver, Oslo, 15 min in car with informant, February 2015
16 Crowd-taxi driver, Oslo, 15 min in car with informant, February 2015
17 Taxi owner interests, telephone, 30 min, January 2016
18 Akershus county, regulating authority, Oslo, 1.5h, February 2016
19 Oslo municipality, regulating authority, Oslo, 1.5h, February 2016
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FOOTNOTES
1. One of the representatives of the management of a taxi dispatcher was also a taxi owner.
